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Notes and Comments
Nally v. Grace Community Church of the
Valley: Clergy Malpractice - A Threat to
Both Liberty and Life
I. Introduction
The tragic suicide of a young man in California, in 1979, led
to a legal battle which seriously threatened first amendment lib-
erties. The threat was clothed in the term "clergy malpractice."
In an effort to make the clergy legally accountable for pastoral
counseling, actions for clergy malpractice have been suggested in
various state courts.1 The claim was first made in 1980, in Nally
v. Grace Community Church of the Valley,2 and for the next
eight years the California courts struggled with the issue.3 The
opinions were varied with respect to the rationales espoused.
1. See, e.g., Handley v. Richards, 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1987); Hester v. Barnett, 723
S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1987); Strock v. Presnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 527 N.E.2d 1235
(1988); see also infra notes 35-52 and accompanying text.
2. No. NCC 18668-B (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Mar. 31, 1980), rev'd and re-
manded, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (opinion deleted from official reporter by California Supreme
Court, see 157 Cal. App. 3d 912 (1984)), dismissed on motion for nonsuit at trial, No.
NCC 18668-B (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed May 24, 1985), judgment granting nonsuit
rev'd, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1987) (review granted for California Supreme Court opinion,
not printed in official reporter, see 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147 (1987)), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278,
763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
3. In 1980, the superior court for Los Angeles County granted summary judgment
for the defendants. Nally, No. NCC 18668-B (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Mar. 31,
1980). In 1984, the California court of appeal reversed and remanded. 204 Cal. Rptr. 303.
On remand, the superior court entered a nonsuit. Nally, No. NCC 18668-B (L.A. County
Super. Ct., filed May 24, 1985). The superior court, however, was again reversed by the
court of appeal in 1987. 240 Cal. Rptr. 215. In 1988, however, the California Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeal and entered a judgment affirming the superior court
nonsuit. 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 109 S. Ct. 1644.
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In Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley' (Nally
II) the California court of appeal held that the defendant pas-
tors of Grace Church had a legal duty to refer a suicidal coun-
selee to mental health professionals including, but not limited
to, psychologists, psychiatrists and therapists. In so holding, the
court found that the defendants had failed in that duty by not
referring to professionals a counselee who later committed sui-
cide. There has been considerable commentary on the subject of
clergy malpractice,6 and the imposition of such a duty is not
without support.7 Such an imposition, however, is also not with-
out opposition. The two-to-one Nally II decision was accompa-
nied by a vigorous dissent written by Justice Cole who stated
that first amendment guarantees prohibit such liability.' Much
of the legal commentary on clergy malpractice lends support to
Justice Cole's position.'
Nally II was eventually reversed by the California Supreme
4. 240 Cal. Rptr. 215.
5. Id. at 229.
6. See Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9
SAN. FERN. V.L. REV. 47 (1981); Ericsson, Clergyman Malpractice: Ramifications of a
New Theory, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 163 (1981); Case Note, Religious Counseling - Parents
Allowed to Pursue Suit Against Church and Clergy For Son's Suicide, 1985 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 213 (1985) [hereinafter Case Note, Religious Counseling]; Comment, Made Out of
Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL.
W.L. REV. 507 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Whole Cloth]; Comment, Clergy Malprac-
tice: Should Pennsylvania Recognize a Cause of Action for Improper Counseling by a
Clergyman?, 92 DICK. L. REV. 223 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, Pennsylvania]; Note,
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous
Conduct be "Free Exercise"?, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1296 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Inten-
tional Infliction of Emotional Distress]; Note, Clergy Malpractice Claims: A New Prob-
lem For Religious Organizations, 16 N. Ky. L. REV. 383 (1988) [hereinafter Note, A New
Problem For Religious Organizations]; Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy
Accountable to a Lower Power, 14 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 137 (1986) [hereinafter Comment,
Lower Power]; Note, Clergy Malpractice: Taking Spiritual Counseling Conflicts Beyond
Intentional Tort Analysis, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 419 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Spiritual
Counseling Conflicts]; Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News For the Good Samari-
tan or a Blessing in Disguise?, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 209 (1985) [hereinafter Comment, Bad
News For the Good Samaritan].
7. See generally Bergman, supra note 6, at 63-64; Comment, Bad News For the
Good Samaritan, supra note 6, at 248-51; Note, Spiritual Counseling Conflicts, supra
note 6, at 444-45;'Comment, Lower Power, supra note 6, at 148-54; see also Nally, 47
Cal. 3d 278, 304, 763 P.2d 948, 964, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 113 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
8. Nally, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
9. See generally Ericsson, supra note 6, at 176-84; Comment, Whole Cloth, supra
note 6, at 525-54; Comment, Pennsylvania, supra note 6, at 232-39.
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Court in Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley 0
(Nally III), where the court, for other than constitutional rea-
sons, refused to impose upon pastoral counselors a duty to refer
to mental health professionals.1" Employing a tort analysis, the
court rejected the imposition of this duty. 2
This Note addresses the issue of clergy malpractice in pas-
toral counseling.1 3 Part II of this Note examines tort liability as
applied to clergy malpractice in pastoral counseling, and pro-
vides an overview of how a number of state courts have handled
the issue. In addition, the first amendment issues raised by such
liability are discussed and the tenets of pastoral counseling are
presented. Part II also provides statistical information on sui-
cide, along with a look at societal and legislative responses to
suicide. Part III sets forth the facts, procedural history, and
opinions of the case. Part IV analyzes the Nally opinions, with a
focus on the first amendment considerations. It explores the na-
ture of secular and nonsecular counseling in relationship to
those considerations and, finally, proposes a solution to the
problem of counseling suicidal persons. This Note concludes
that the first amendment bars actions for clergy malpractice in
pastoral counseling and that effective counseling intervention for
suicidal persons must include a systematic and integrated ap-
proach which encourages understanding and cooperation be-
10. 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97.
11. Id. at 299-301, 763 P.2d at 960-61, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11.
12. Id.
13. The Nally court also found that the trial court acted within its discretion when
it excluded evidence which tended to support an action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 300, 304, 763 P.2d at 961, 964, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 110,
113. There was, however, no suggestion that the clergy would not be held liable for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress under different circumstances. The discussion of a
cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress is beyond the scope of this
Note. Wrongful death actions, based on intentional infliction of emotional distress, are
actionable in California. See generally Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d
148, 729 P.2d 743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987); Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d
197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1982); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal.
3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (for an analysis of the elements necessary
for such an action); Tate v. Canonica, 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960). In
Nally III, the court indicated that, had the facts been different, it would have heard an
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress since clergypersons are liable for
intentional torts. For a more detailed analysis of the clergy's liability for intentional tort
see Note, Religious Counseling, supra note 6; Note, Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, supra note 6; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1)-(2) (1965).
1990]
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tween the secular and nonsecular world without infringing upon
first amendment liberties.
II. Background
A. Clergy Malpractice as a Tort Cause of Action
1. Tort Liability and Duty of Care
The term "malpractice" refers to professional miscon-
duct - it means the failure to exercise the degree of skill and
learning normally used in similar circumstances by members of
the same profession. 14 Thus, clergy malpractice infers a profes-
sional standard of skill and learning against which the clergyper-
son's alleged misconduct is measured. 16 Although there is no
general agreement with respect to what should be actionable
under a theory of clergy malpractice,16 it is clear that it is a the-
ory of tort liability,1 7 albeit not intentional tort liability."
Liability for clergy malpractice includes the elements neces-
sary for any negligence cause of action. The traditional elements
require that there be a duty of care and a breach of that duty
which proximately caused actual damage.1 9 There must be a vio-
lation of a legal duty for a tort to occur.2 It is a question of law
whether one person has a legal duty of care toward another per-
son - as is the more specific question of whether he has as-
sumed such a duty by establishing a special relationship with
that person.21
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965).
15. Bergman, supra note 6, at 62-64.
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 35-52, 151-63 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 13.
19. W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 30 (5th ed. 1984).
20. 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law § 6 (Torts) (9th ed. 1988).
21. At common law a defendant is liable only if he bears a special relationship to the
dangerous person or to the potential victim. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal.
3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334, 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976). In the landmark case of
Rowland v. Christian, the court concluded that liability should be imposed for an injury
caused by a failure to use ordinary care or skill. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 97 (1968). The court stated:
whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to
another ... that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with
regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or
property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such
[Vol. 11:137
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The California courts have found that both a hospital and a
treating psychiatrist have a special relationship with a suicidal
patient when they accept responsibility for the patient's care. In
Meier v. Ross General Hospital,22 for example, a hospital agreed
to care for a suicidal patient who later committed suicide while
under the hospital's care.2 Due to the special relationship with
the patient, the court held that the hospital and the psychiatrist
had a duty to prevent foreseeable suicide.2 ' The California
courts have also held that a psychiatrist had a duty to warn
when it was likely that a client would injure a third person. 26
Without a legal duty, any injury is merely an injury without a
legal wrong.2 6
2. Clergy Malpractice as a Tort
Typically, the validity of clergy malpractice is discussed in
relation to the clergyperson in the role of counselor.2 " It has,
however, been applied more generally:
Malpractice is the term we must also apply to professional minis-
ters of the gospel who violate their trust. Preachers who raise
money for themselves and not the work, who use people instead
of serve people, who lust for power and sex and status, and who
use their platform to satisfy their greed violate the code of the
spiritual elder .... .
Regardless of how the term is applied, clergy malpractice implies
that there is a standard of care within the ministry to which a
clergyperson must adhere.2
A standard for clergy counselors infers that anyone within a
particular religion or denomination could counsel under that
danger.
Id. at 112, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100 (quoting Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D.
503, 509 (1883)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
22. 69 Cal. 2d 420, 445 P.2d 519, 71 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1968).
23. Id. at 423-24, 445 P.2d at 522-23, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 906-07.
24. Id.
25. See Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
26. 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law (Torts) § 6 (9th ed. 1988).
27. Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 551 (Mo. App. 1987); see also infra notes 35-
52 and accompanying text.
28. Mitchell, Disgraced Preachers: The Word is Malpractice, FUNDAMENTALIST
JOURNAL, June 1988, at 14.
29. See supra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
1990]
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standard.30 Samuel E. Ericsson, director of the Christian Legal
Society's Center for Law and Religious Freedom, doubts the
ability of a court to define a standard of care because of its in-
ability to separate the moral from the mental aspects of counsel-
ing."' He believes that the issues raised in clergy counseling
cases are religious, and not conducive to judicial review because
of their inherent lack of objectivity.32 Conversely, Rabbi Ben
Zion Bergman, Dean of Students and Senior Lecturer in
Rabbinic Literature at the University of Judaism in Los Ange-
les, suggests that members of the clergy should be held to a well-
defined standard of care when they function as counselors,33 and
that deviation from that standard should be deemed actionable
malpractice.34
B. Other States
Other states have been cautious in allowing an action for
clergy malpractice in counseling. Typically, the courts have
tended to avoid the issue. For example, Hester v. Barnett"3 in-
volved a Baptist minister who allegedly defamed the plaintiffs, a
husband and wife, by accusing them of physically and emotion-
ally abusing their children. s6 The plaintiffs brought an action
which alleged "Ministerial Malpractice, Alienation of Affections,
Defamation of Character, Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, Invasion of Privacy, and Interference with Contract. '3 7
The lower court dismissed the action on all counts." The Mis-
souri court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the ministerial
30. See generally Ericsson, supra note 6, at 171. See also Comment, Lower Power,
supra note 6, at 150-61.
31. Ericsson, supra note 6, at 167-69. Interestingly, Samuel E. Ericsson was co-coun-
sel for the defendants in Nally. He was also a member and an administrative pastor at
Grace Community Church. See Hauled Into Court: The New Trials of Ministry, LEAD-
ERSHIP FORUM, Winter, 1985 at 127, 129, 136.
32. Ericsson, supra note 6, at 169.
33. Bergman, supra note 6, at 62-64; see also Comment, Lower Power, supra note 6,
at 157-60 (the writer offers a practical solution to establishing a duty of care through a
nonreligious process).
34. Bergman, supra note 6, at 57-61.
35. 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1987).
36. Id. at 550.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 549.
[Vol. 11:137
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malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress
counts, but reversed the dismissal of the other counts. 9 Writing
for a unanimous court, Judge Shangler stated that a valid clergy
malpractice action must address incidents of clergy/communi-
cant relationships not already actionable. 40 The court stressed
that malpractice was not a theory of ordinary negligence or in-
tentional tort, because these were already actionable regardless
of their professional color.41 Although the court acknowledged
that a theory of clergy malpractice might unduly involve the
court in church functions, it also inferred that such an action
would be possible under different circumstances. 2 Judge Shan-
gler stated: "The viability of a clergy malpractice remedy for
negligent counseling, nevertheless assumed, the petition brought
by the Hesters as Count I [ministerial malpractice] does not al-
lege the tort.' 4
In Handley v. Richards," the plaintiffs brought a wrongful
death action which alleged clergy malpractice during counsel-
ing.4' This case concerned a minister who became sexually in-
volved with the wife of a couple he had been counseling for their
marital difficulties. 4'6 The complaint alleged that the deceitful
manner of counseling had contributed to the husband's eventual
suicide.' 7 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
order dismissing the plaintiff's petition for failure to state a
cause of action. 8
In Ohio, a former husband brought a clergy malpractice ac-
tion against a minister and a church after he learned that the
minister had been sexually involved with his wife while counsel-
ing the couple for marital problems.' 9 The Ohio Supreme Court
held that an action for clergy malpractice was not viable under
39. Id. at 564.
40. Id. at 551.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 553.
43. Id.
44. 518 So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1987).
45. Id. at 683.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Strock v. Presnell, 38 Ohio St. 3d 207, 208, 527 N.E.2d 1235, 1236 (1988).
1990]
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the facts before the court.6 0 The court found that the defend-
ant's alleged acts fell under an intentional tort theory.5 1. Writing
for the majority, Justice Wright stated that "[ffor clergy mal-
practice to be recognized, the cleric's behavior, even if it is re-
lated to his 'professional' duties, must fall outside the scope of
other recognized torts." 2
C. Constitutional Considerations
1. The First Amendment
The first amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . .. "53
The fourteenth amendment makes the first amendment guaran-
tees applicable to the states.6
a. The Free Exercise Clause
The free exercise clause" embraces two concepts - the
freedom to believe and the freedom to act. The freedom to be-
lieve is an absolute freedom. However, the freedom to act, in the
interest of protecting society, is subject to governmental regula-
tion.6 With respect to the absolute freedom to believe, a court
may not address the truth or falsity of an asserted religious be-
lief. 7 It may only consider whether the belief, no matter how
preposterous, is sincerely held by the individual. 8 Conversely,
under the freedom to act concept, a court may impose liability
when religious conduct poses a substantial threat to public
50. Id. at 212, 527 N.E.2d at 1239.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
54. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (establishment clause made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause made applicable
to the states by the fourteenth amendment).
55. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
56. 310 U.S. at 303-04.
57. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944), rev'd on other grounds, 329
U.S. 187 (1946); see also Ericsson, supra note 6, at 176-79; Note, Spiritual Counseling
Conflicts, supra note 6, at 426-29 (discussion of Justice Douglas' analysis in Ballard).
58. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
[Vol. 11:137
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safety, peace or order. 9
To determine whether legislative action violates the free ex-
ercise clause, a two-pronged test is applied.60 The first prong re-
quires the person alleging the violation to show that the action is
coercive because it operates to circumscribe the individual in his
religious beliefs and practices.61 If the action is deemed coercive,
the court then assesses whether there is a sufficiently compelling
state interest to justify the burden on religion. 2 If the state's
interest is insufficient, the government action is
unconstitutional. 63
b. The Establishment Clause
The establishment clause64 mandates the separation of
church and state. In Everson v. Board of Education," the Su-
preme Court held that the clause means that no government
may set up an official church, prefer one religion, force a belief
in one religion, or participate in the affairs of religious organiza-
tions.6 6 A three-part analysis was set forth in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man 67 to determine whether a governmental action is acceptable
under the establishment clause. To be valid, the action must
have a clear secular purpose, its primary effect must neither ad-
vance nor inhibit religion, and it must not foster excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion."
59. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
60. For a thorough analysis of the two-pronged free exercise test as applied to clergy
malpractice, see Comment, Whole Cloth, supra note 6, at 534-42.
61. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
62. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; see also Comment, Whole Cloth, supra note 6, at 534-
42.
63. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
64. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
65. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
66. Id. at 15-16.
67. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
68. Id. at 612-13. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the Lemon test. However, in recent years the Court has adopted the modified
Lemon test suggested in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch, which focuses on in-
stitutional entanglement and endorsement or disapproval of religion. 465 U.S. 668, 688
(1971). See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989); Texas Monthly v.
Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989); Wallace v. Jafree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); School Dist. of the
City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
1990]
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2. The First Amendment and Clergy Malpractice
The California legislature has taken care to avoid violating
first amendment principles by specifically excluding religion
from certain laws. For example, the codified law dealing with the
licensing of doctors states that the provisions shall not "regulate,
prohibit, or apply to any other kind of treatment by prayer, nor
interfere in any way with the practice of religion." 9 The codified
law dealing with services provided by psychiatric personnel ex-
empts services "when done by the tenets of any well-recognized
church or denomination .... ,,70 The law which regulates the
licensing of marriage and family counselors states that "[tihis
chapter shall not apply to any priest, rabbi or minister of the
gospel of any religious denomination when performing counsel-
ing services as part of his or her pastoral or professional duties
"171
With respect to counseling, Ericsson contends that, absent
actual malice, the first amendment should bar clergy malpractice
actions.72 He argues that pastoral counseling involves a spiritual
realm which secular courts are ill-equipped and constitutionally
unable to regulate.73
Bergman, on the other hand, supports an action for clergy
malpractice. In his view, only the purely sacerdotal functions of
the clergy are protected from state regulation by virtue of the
first amendment. 7' Bergman distinguishes the clergy's counsel-
ing function from the purely sacerdotal by describing the secu-
larization of pastoral counseling and contends that a duty of
care may be imposed without violating the first amendment."
Essential to the first amendment question is whether the
realm of clergy counseling is deemed to be a purely religious
function. A purely religious function is less likely to be regulated
69. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2063 (Deering 1990).
70. Id. § 4508.
71. Id. § 4980.01.
72. Ericsson, supra note 6, at 167-69.
73. Id. at 171-72.
74. Bergman, supra note 6, at 57.
75. Id. at 58:59. See generally Note, Spiritual Counseling Conflicts, supra note 6;
Comment, Bad News For the Good Samaritan, supra note 6. For a practical solution to
establishing a duty of care through a nonreligious process see Comment, Lower Power,
supra note 6, at 157-60.
[Vol. 11:137
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by government action because of first amendment guarantees. If
pastoral counseling is deemed to be a secularized, nonreligious
function, governmental action may more readily pass constitu-
tional review.s Some argue, however, that even as a religious
function, pastoral counseling should be subject to governmental
control."
D. Tenets of Pastoral Counseling
The tenets of pastoral counseling within Christianity7 are
no different from the tenets of the Sunday sermon. The words of
counsel and the words of the sermon are based on the Bible,
which is deemed by both counselor and preacher to be the Word
of God.79
The Bible teaches that Christians are fully competent and
equipped to instruct and counsel one another.80 Jay Adams, a
prominent Christian counselor, believes that the Christian coun-
selor is completely able to meet every counseling situation
through the use of the Scriptures.8 In his opinion, the Scrip-
tures should be the counselor's sole guide. Adams wrote that
"qualified Christian counselors properly trained in the Scrip-
tures are competent to counsel - more competent than psychi-
76. Commentators have suggested that the establishment clause may not apply to
clergy counseling because they consider such counseling a nonreligious function. Some
commentators who acknowledge that the free exercise clause may apply, contend that
the state interest in the protection of life would be sufficiently compelling to outweigh
any burden on the clergy counselor. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also
Bergman, supra note 6, at 57-61.
77. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
78. Although the emphasis of this Note is on Christian tenets because the defend-
ants were Christians, the principles asserted herein are applicable to any sincerely held
set of religious beliefs.
79. See generally J. ADAMS, THE USE OF THE SCRIPTURES IN COUNSELING (1975)
[hereinafter J. ADAMS, SCRIPTURES]; J. ADAMS, COMPETENT TO COUNSEL (1970) [hereinafter
J. ADAMS, COMPETENT]; L. CRABB, JR., EFFECTIVE BIBLICAL COUNSELING (1977).
80. The Apostle Paul wrote to the Christian church in Rome: "Personally I am satis-
fied about you, my brethren, that you yourselves are rich in goodness, amply filled with
all [spiritual] knowledge and competent to admonish and counsel and instruct one an-
other also." Romans 15:14 (Amplified New Testament). To Timothy, Paul wrote that
"[a]ll Scripture is God-breathed and is useful for teaching, rebuking, correcting and
training in righteousness, so that the man of God may be thoroughly equipped for every
good work." 2 Timothy 3:16, 17 (New International).
81. J. ADAMS, SCRIPTURES, supra note 79, at 4-5.
1990]
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atrists or anyone else. '82 Adams is wholly opposed to referring
counselees to secular psychiatrists, and only as an exception
would he consider referring counselees to another competent
Christian counselor. 8
Total reliance on the Scriptures and a reluctance to refer to
mental health professionals are not characteristics of all Chris-
tian counselors. Some may be less confident in their ability to
counsel and are, therefore, more apt to refer to others.84 Dr.
Lawrence Crabb, Jr., who served as Chairman of the Depart-
ment of Counseling at Grace Theological Seminary, wrote that
the only reliable authority in counseling is found in the Scrip-
tures. 85 He also indicated, however, that psychology and psycho-
therapy could offer insights into human behavior which would in
no way contradict the Scriptures and could even complement
Christian counseling.
6
Some have suggested that mental health professionals
should be trained in referring people to clergy. 7 "[W]hen issues
of basic value commitments to religious and quasi-religious posi-
tions are involved or when actions are evaluated in terms thereof
... [t]here is a valid concern that the psychologist and other
mental health professionals need explicit training in recognizing
these problems and referring them to clergy." 88
82. J. ADAMS, COMPETENT, supra note 79, at 18.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Alcorn, Pastor - Teacher or Super - Counselor?, 6 LEADERSHiP FORUM
131 (1985). The writer referred to himself as a pastor in psychologist's clothing, and
indicated that he had referred people to lay counselors. Id. at 135. A study of 127 male
clergy from ten Protestant denominations concluded in part: "Overall, this study con-
firmed that, as in previous research, the clergy spend a significant amount of time coun-
seling a wide variety of problems and they also refer a variety of clients, primarily to
mental health professionals." Winger and Hunsberger, Clergy Counseling Practices,
Christian Orthodoxy and Problem Solving Styles, 16 J. PSYCHOLOGY AND THEOLOGY 41,
47 (1988).
85. L. CRABS JR., supra note 79, at 15.
86. Id.
87. See Gorsuch and Meylin, Toward a Co-Professional Model of Clergy-Psycholo-
gist Referral, 7 J. PSYCHOLOGY AND CHRISTIANITY 3, 23-31 (1988). The authors stated that
there are clients with religious concerns who would "have difficulty in communicating
their source of distress to psychologists." Id. at 30.
88. Id. at 23.
[Vol. 11:137
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E. Suicide Prevention
In the United States today, suicide is the third leading
cause of death among young people between the ages of fifteen
and twenty-four years.8 9 While the overall rate of suicide for
other age groups has slightly declined, the suicide rate for young
people has risen seventy-two percent since 1968.90 Each day in
this nation, fourteen young people will kill themselves and an
estimated 700 will attempt suicide."'
Suicide prevention involves both immediate crisis interven-
tion and long-term secondary intervention.2 Recent legislation
reflects a growing awareness and concern for intervention into
suicidal behavior. For example, California has enacted legisla-
tion to develop a five-year youth suicide prevention program to
gather research and develop a training program involving stu-
dents, parents, teachers, school administrators, mental health
professionals, local social service agencies, juvenile justice repre-
sentatives, and others concerned with the problem of youth sui-
cide.9 Illinois has passed similar legislation." California's legis-
lation regulating Community Mental Health Services includes
suicide prevention under its definition of crisis intervention,95
and provisions for emergency telephone systems include suicide
prevention services.98
New Jersey,'9 7 Wisconsin,9" and Maryland 9 have enacted
legislation to establish youth suicide prevention programs in the
schools. Rhode Island has established a system which incorpo-
rates suicide prevention into existing health education pro-
89. G. EVANS & N. FARBEROW, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SUICIDE 5 (1988).
90. D. CURRAN, ADOLESCENT SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR 14-15 (1987).
91. G. EVANS & N. FARBEROW, supra note 89, at 5; see also D. CURRAN, supra note
90, at 15, where the author cites attempted versus actual suicide rates as high as 312:1.
92. See generally D. CURRAN, supra note 90, at 177-78; G. EVANS & N. FARBEROW,
supra note 89, at 171-73; D. EVERSTINE & L. EVERSTINE, PEOPLE IN CRISIS: STRATEGIC
THERAPEUTIC INTERVENTIONS 31 (1983); J. ZUSMAN & D. DAVIDSON, ORGANIZING THE COM-
MUNITY TO PREVENT SUICIDE 20 (1971).
93. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5698 (Deering 1989).
94. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, para. 100-58 (Smith-Hurd 1990).
95. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008 (Deering 1990).
96. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 53110 (Deering 1990).
97. N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:9A-12 (1987).
98. WIS. STAT. § 115.365 (1987-88).
99. MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 7-4A-01 (1989).
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grams. 100 This program requires public school teachers, desig-
nated to teach suicide prevention, to attend workshops provided
by Samaritan, Incorporated.' 0 ' The Texas legislature has created
the position of Youth Suicide Prevention Officer, appointed by
the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, to
serve as a liaison to the public schools. 102 Connecticut has cre-
ated an advisory board on youth suicide prevention which in-
cludes, among others, a psychiatrist, a psychologist, a board of
education representative, a high school student, a high school
faculty member, a college student and a college faculty
member. 03
New York has established an adolescent suicide prevention
program which specifically addresses educating the clergy. This
program provides grants "to public or private not-for-profit or-
ganizations, or public or private schools, acting alone or in con-
cert with others, in order to educate the general population, and
in particular parents, teachers, clergy, health and mental health
professionals and adolescents themselves .... 104
A National Committee on Youth Suicide Prevention was es-
tablished. and incorporated in 1985.105 Its primary purpose is to
reduce the number of actual and attempted suicides through
public awareness and prevention programs.106 There are cur-
rently more than 250 suicide prevention centers in the United
States.107 Most of them operate twenty-four hour crisis hotlines
and rely heavily on trained lay volunteers to provide essential
person-to-person services. 08 Volunteer training includes how to
recognize suicidal tendencies and encourages direct questions re-
100. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-22-14.
101. The Samaritans, founded in England in 1953, is an international suicide pre-
vention organization. It is a nonprofessional, nonreligious agency which offers a listening
ear rather than counseling. They rarely refer to mental health professionals. See G. Ev-
ANS & N. FARBEROW, supra note 89, at 242; D. FRANCIS, SUICIDE 111-12 (1989).
102. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-9A (Vernon 1990).
103. 1989 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. 89-191 (West).
104. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.49 (McKinney 1990).
105. D. FRANCIS, supra note 101, at 112.
106. Id.
107. G. EVANS & N. FARBEROW, supra note 89, at 56. Recognized standards for certi-
fication of crisis intervention centers throughout the United States and Canada have
been developed by the American Association of Suicidology. Id. at 12.
108. Id. at 242-43, 270; see also, D. FRANCIS, supra note 101, at 103-15; D. CURRAN,
supra note 90, at 177-90.
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garding a person's intent to commit suicide. 0 9
III. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley
A. The Facts
On April 1, 1979, twenty-four year old Kenneth Nally com-
mitted suicide by a self-inflicted shotgun wound to the head.
The following year, his parents filed a wrongful death action
against Grace Community Church of the Valley, and four
Church pastors: MacArthur, Thompson, Cory, and Rea." °
Kenneth Nally had been raised a Roman Catholic, but he
converted to Protestantism while attending the University of
California Los Angeles (UCLA)."' His conversion caused fric-
tion within his family." 2 He began attending Grace Church in
1974 and until 1979, was active in various church ministries." 3
In 1975, Nally saw a secular psychologist about problems he
was having with his girlfriend." 4 During this time, he also estab-
lished a friendship with defendant Pastor Cory with whom he
informally discussed his problems."' In 1978, Nally began a
"discipling relationship" with Pastor Rea with whom he also dis-
cussed his personal problems."' Nally and Rea had only five
"discipling" sessions."' Until the spring of 1979, those five ses-
sions and his informal meetings with Cory were the only coun-
seling sessions that Nally had with the defendants."'
In February of 1979, Nally's mother arranged for him to see
109. See G. EVANS & N. FARBEROW, supra note 89, at 58-59; D. EVERSTINE & L. Ev-
ERSTINE, supra note 92, at 214. The authors reflect on how regrettable it is that some
people are in therapy for years before they are asked if they have ever thought of killing
themselves. "Do not presume that a client has no thought of suicide; when in doubt, ask;
the earlier in treatment this question is asked, the better the client will be served." D.
EVERSTINE & L. EVERSTINE, supra note 92, at 215.
110. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 283, 763 P.2d
948, 949, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 99 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
111. Id. at 284, 763 P.2d at 950, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 284, 763 P.2d at 950, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
115. Id. at 284, 763 P.2d at 950, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
116. Id. at 284, 763 P.2d at 950, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 100.'Discipling relationships were
set up by Grace church to assist young Christians with problems and questions they
might encounter in their lives as Christians.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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a medical doctor, who prescribed an anti-depressant. 119 Later
that month, Nally saw another physician who suggested that he
undergo a full physical examination.' Neither doctor referred
Nally to a psychiatrist.' At this time, Nally spoke about his
problems to Pastor Thomson at an unscheduled counseling ses-
sion during which he stated that he had considered suicide while
a student at UCLA.122
On March 11, 1979, Nally attempted suicide by taking an
overdose of anti-depressants and, on the following day, he sepa-
rately told Pastors MacArthur and Rea that he was sorry he had
not succeeded. 123 During his hospital stay a psychiatrist recom-
mended that Nally commit himself, but he refused and left the
hospital on March 17, 1979.124 He then stayed with Pastor Mac-
Arthur for several days. 2 5 MacArthur encouraged Nally to keep
his appointments with the hospital psychiatrist and he also set
up an appointment for Nally to see a doctor who was a deacon
at Grace Church. '2 The deacon advised Nally to commit himself
to a psychiatric hospital - but Nally again refused. 2 7 Between
March 21 and March 31, 1979, Nally spoke with Pastor Thom-
son, two physicians, and a psychologist. He also visited a psy-
chological clinic to discuss possible therapy. 8 On April 1, 1979,
Nally went to a friend's apartment and shot himself in the head
with a shotgun.12 9
B. Lower Court Decisions
In March of 1980, Kenneth Nally's parents filed a three
count wrongful death action in the superior court of Los Ange-
les, alleging clergyman malpractice, negligence, and outrageous
conduct. 30 The superior court granted the defendants' motion
119. Id. at 285, 763 P.2d at 951, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 286, 763 P.2d at 951, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 287, 763 P.2d at 952, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 101.
129. Id. at 287, 763 P.2d at 952, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
130. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, No. NCC 18668-B (L.A.
[Vol. 11:137
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss1/4
1990] CLERGY MALPRACTICE
for summary judgment. 13 1 The case then went to the California
court of appeal, and in Nally v. Grace Community Church of
the Valley' (Nally I), the court reversed the superior court in a
two-to-one decision. 38 The Nally I majority held that a cause of
action for wrongful death, arising out of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, had been adequately pled. 34 The court did
not address clergy malpractice, negligence, or whether the de-
fendants had a duty to refer Nally to mental health profession-
als."' Dissenting Justice Hanson concluded that there were no
triable issues of fact under any theory, including intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress.' The Supreme Court of Califor-
nia denied a hearing and depublished the court of appeal's
Nally I decision.13 7
On remand, the superior court entered a nonsuit, stating
that "[tihere is no compelling state interest to climb the wall of
separation of church [and state] and plunge into the pit on the
other side that certainly has no bottom."'3 8 The case went back
to the court of appeal, and was again reversed and remanded in
Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley'3 9 (Nally II),
County Super. Ct., filed Mar. 31, 1980), rev'd and remanded, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (opinion
deleted from official reporter by California Supreme Court, see 157 Cal. App. 3d 912
(1984)), dismissed on motion for nonsuit at trial, No. NCC 18668-B (L.A. County Super.
Ct., filed May 24, 1985), judgment granting nonsuit rev'd, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1987)
(review granted for California Supreme Court opinion, not printed in official reporter,
see 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147 (1987)), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
131. Id.
132. 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (1984) (depublished opinion deleted from official reporter by
California Supreme Court, see 157 Cal. App. 3d 912 (1984)), dismissed on motion for
nonsuit at trial, No. NCC 18668-B (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed May 24, 1985), judg-
ment granting nonsuit rev'd, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1987) (review granted for supreme
court opinion, not printed in official reporter, see 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147 (1987)), rev'd, 47
Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
133. Id. at 309.
134. Id. at 307.
135. Id. at 309.
136. Id. at 321 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 303.
138. See Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 289, 763
P.2d 948, 954, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1988), (quoting Nally v. Grace Community Church
of the Valley, No. NCC 18668-B (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Mar. 31, 1980)), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
139. 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1987) (review granted for California Supreme Court opin-
ion, not printed in official reporter, see 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147 (1987)), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d
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another two-to-one decision. 14 0 The Nally II court combined the
clergy malpractice and negligence counts to create a cause of ac-
tion for negligent failure to prevent suicide and held that the
nontherapist counselor, both religious and secular, had a duty to
refer suicidal persons to mental health professionals."" The
Nally II court discussed the first amendment issues raised by
imposing such a duty. 14
2
Associate Justice Johnson, speaking for the majority, stated
that holding pastoral counselors to the same standard as secular
counselors neither tended to establish nor to promote religion,
and therefore did not violate the establishment clause.'43 -The
court afforded the free exercise clause much more discussion,
but ultimately held that the state's compelling interest in sui-
cide prevention was served by imposing upon pastoral counsel-
ors a duty to refer.' Justice Johnson stated that there was no
direct burden on religious expression, 45 and that the first
amendment would not be offended even if the duty were im-
posed on a religious counselor who had a religious belief that
suicidal individuals should not be referred to mental health
professionals. 146
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Cole stated that
"[e]ntirely apart from any other reasons why the majority incor-
rectly holds that potential liability can exist on the part of de-
fendants, familiar first amendment principles clearly stand in
the way of liability."' 47 Justice Cole criticized the majority for
rejecting Pastor Thomson's testimony that the Bible gives the
root answers to why emotional or psychiatric problems exist.141
He asserted that the majority had violated the principle set
forth in United States v. Ballard,'" that a court may not ad-
278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
140. Id. at 243.
141. Id. at 219.
142. Id. at 230-37; see supra notes 53-77 and accompanying text.
143. Nally, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 230-31.
144. Id. at 235.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 237.
147. Id. at 244 (Cole, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 245 (Cole, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 78-88 and accompanying
149. 322 U.S. 78 (1944), revd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 187 (1940).
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dress the truth or falsity of a religious belief.150
C. The California Supreme Court
1. The Majority Opinion
In Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley151
(Nally III), the Supreme Court of California reversed Nally II
without addressing the first amendment issues.1 52 The Nally III
court based its opinion on a tort analysis holding that the plain-
tiffs had failed to meet the threshold requirements for imposing
on the defendants a duty to prevent suicide.'53 The court further
held that there was no special relationship'" between Nally and
the defendants, and that there was no legal duty to refer. 155 The
court also discussed foreseeability and causation"" in relation to
imposing a duty of care, and found that these necessary ele-
ments of a tort cause of action were missing.15 7 Holding that the
superior court had properly granted a nonsuit in all causes of
action, 58 Chief Justice Lucas, writing for the majority, expressly
stated that there was no need to address the constitutional is-
sues posed by the defendants.'59
2. The Concurring Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kaufman strongly dis-
agreed with the majority's conclusion that the defendants owed
no duty of care. 60 Justice Kaufman concluded that the defend-
ants had a duty to recognize their own limitations in counseling
a suicidal person and to refer that person to a mental health
150. Nally, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 245; see also supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
151. 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1644 (1989).
152. Id. at 291, 763 P.2d at 955, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
153. Id. at 299, 763 P.2d at 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
154. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
155. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 296, 763 P.2d at 958, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 107.
156. See W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §§ 41-44 (5th ed.
1984).
157. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 296-97, 763 P.2d at 958-59, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 107-08.
158. Id. at 304, 763 P.2d at 964, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
159. Id. at 291, 763 P.2d at 955, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
160. Id. at 304, 763 P.2d at 964, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 113 (Kaufman, J., concurring).
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professional. 61 Justice Kaufman further indicated that this duty
was "religiously neutral," and that the corresponding compelling
state interest in preserving the life of a would-be suicidal person
would override any first amendment challenge."' 2 Justice Kauf-
man, joined by Justice Broussard, concurred with the majority
only because he believed that the defendants neither breached
their duty to refer, nor contributed causally to Nally's suicide.6 s
IV. Analysis
The final determination on clergy malpractice in Nally v.
Grace Community Church of the Valley,16' was based on a tort
analysis.6"' Although considerable commentary was available on
the first amendment issues raised under a theory of clergy mal-
practice, 166 the California Supreme Court never addressed those
issues in Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley
(Nally III).167 In a well-reasoned analysis, the Nally III court
found that the tort essentials of a special relationship and a legal
duty were lacking."6 " Nevertheless, implicit in the Nally III
court's statement that the plaintiffs failed to meet the "thresh-
old requirements"'6 9 for a duty to refer, lies the inescapable con-
clusion that a clergy malpractice action is viable if those require-
ments are met: Within those requirements there has to be a
161. Id. at 309-10, 763 P.2d at 967, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 116.
162. Id. at 313, 763 P.2d at 970, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
163. Id. at 314, 763 P.2d at 970, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 119.
164. No. NCC 18668-B (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed Mar. 31, 1980), rev'd and re-
manded, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303 (opinion deleted from official reporter by California Supreme
Court, see 157 Cal. App. 3d 912 (1984)), dismissed on motion for nonsuit at trial, No.
NCC 18668-B (L.A. County Super. Ct., filed May 24, 1985), judgment granting nonsuit
rev'd, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1987) (review granted for California Supreme Court opinion,
not printed in official reporter, see 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147 (1987)), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278,
763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
165. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 291-300, 763 P.2d at 955-61, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 104-10; see
supra notes 151-63 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215,
230-37 (1987) (review granted for California Supreme Court opinion, not printed in offi-
cial reporter, see 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147 (1987)), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253
Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989); see also supra note 6 and ac-
companying text.
167. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97.
168. Id. at 291-300, 763 P.2d at 955-61, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 104-10; see also supra
notes 19-26, 151-59 and accompanying text.
169. Id. at 299, 763 P.2d at 960, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
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legal duty to refer suicidal counselees. 170 The California legisla-
ture could create a legal duty by mandating that pastoral coun-
selors refer suicidal counselees to mental health professionals. 7',
Then, the threshold requirements for a duty to refer would, ar-
guably, be satisfied, making such an action viable.
In an equally well reasoned tort analysis, concurring Justice
Kaufman reasoned that there was a special relationship between
Nally and the defendants, and that there was a legal duty to
refer, but that this legal duty had been satisfied by the defend-
ants. 17  Justice Kaufman summarily dismissed the constitutional
questions, stating that there was no merit to the contention that
imposing a duty to refer on the defendants would burden their
first amendment right to the free exercise of religion.'
A. The First Amendment and Clergy Malpractice in Pastoral
Counseling
Nally H was the only Nally case in which the first amend-
ment issues relating to clergy malpractice in pastoral counseling
were addressed. 74 Nevertheless, the majority's statement that
the imposition of a duty to refer placed no direct burden on reli-
gious expression reflects the court's misunderstanding of the
purely religious nature Of pastoral counseling. 75 There are
Christian counselors who sincerely believe that it is unbiblical to
refer their counselees to mental health professionals. 76  These
170. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
171. In Nally II, dissenting Justice Cole suggested that it was the legislature's role
to enact policy on clergy malpractice. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley,
240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 243 (Cole, J., dissenting) (review granted for California Supreme
Court opinion, not printed in official reporter, see 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147 (1987), rev'd, 47
Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
See also Note, A New Problem for Religious Organizations, supra note 6, at 394-96 (au-
thor suggests that state legislatures take steps to establish guidelines on clergy
malpractice).
172. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d 309-11, 763 P.2d at 967-68, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 116-17; see also
supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
173. Nally, 47 Cal. 3d at 312, 763 P.2d at 969, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
174. Nally, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215.
175. Id. at 235; see also supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
176. Justice Cole acknowledged this in his dissent and criticized the majority: "It
[the Nally H court] seemingly rejects his [Pastor Thomson's] testimony that the Bible
gives the root answer to why emotional or psychiatric problems exist .... In effect, the
majority has found one set of views to be false or not adequate, something which it may
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counselors could not practice this belief if they were forced to
refer counselees. 17 7 Any imposition of such a duty to refer would,
therefore, fail under the two-pronged test of the free exercise
clause of the first amendment. The first prong would be violated
because the Christian counselor would be forced to act in oppo-
sition to a sincerely held religious belief.17 8 The state would then
have to demonstrate, under the second prong of the test, that a
compelling state interest justified placing this burden on the
counselor. 179 This would require a showing that the burdened ac-
tivity (pastoral counseling without referral) posed a substantial
threat to public safety, peace, and order.' Because mental
health professionals themselves do not recommend simple refer-
ral, it would be difficult to show that a pastor's failure to refer
posed a threat to public safety, peace, and order.' 8 ' Further-
more, there is no evidence that pastoral counselors are any less
effective than mental health professionals in preventing
suicide."8 2
Imposing a duty on pastoral counselors to refer to mental
health professionals would also violate the establishment clause
of the first amendment. 183 To be valid under the establishment
clause, the state action would have to pass the Lemon test. This
test requires that the action have a clear secular purpose, that it
neither advance nor inhibit religion, and that it avoid excessive
government entanglement with religion.8 4 Although a pastoral
not do." Nally, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 245 (Cole, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 78-88
and accompanying text.
177. But in Nally H, the majority said that "none of the legal responsibilities recog-
nized in this opinion prohibit the Church's counselors from relying on religious doctrine
to deal with the counselees' mental disorders and emotional problems." Nally, 240 Cal.
Rptr. at 236.
178. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. For a thorough analysis of the free
exercise clause and the establishment clause as applied to clergy malpractice in pastoral
counseling see Comment, Whole Cloth, supra note 6, at 525-43.
181. See infra notes 200-10 and accompanying text.
182. According to Adams the suicide rate among psychiatrists is higher than among
other groups in the medical profession. J. ADAMS, COMPETENT, supra note 79, at 21 n.3.
183. See supra notes 64-68; see also Comment, Whole Cloth, supra note 6, at 525-
43.
184. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 610 (1971); see also supra notes 64-68 and
accompanying text.
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counselor would be forced to act in opposition to the religious
belief that it is unbiblical to refer counselees to mental health
professionals, the action would have an arguably secular purpose
of protecting suicidal counselees. 18 The primary effect of the ac-
tion, however, would be to express disapproval and to inhibit the
practice of a religion which teaches that the Bible is the only
source necessary for effective counseling.186 Furthermore, be-
cause the government would be forcing a counselor to act
outside his religious beliefs, there would be excessive govern-
ment entanglement.187
Defendant Pastor Thomson testified that because of his re-
ligious beliefs, he would not refer a counselee to a mental health
professional whose viewpoint was inconsistent with the Bible. '88
Forcing Pastor Thomson, or any counselor who has similar be-
liefs,. to refer counselees io mental health professionals would di-
rectly impinge upon their religious beliefs.1"
The facts before the Nally III court clearly supported a
finding of first amendment violations. The Nally H court had
imposed a duty to refer"1 0 - a duty which would have forced a
defendant pastor to act in opposition to his sincerely held reli-
gious belief that it is unbiblical to refer. There is no evidence
that pastoral counseling without referral poses a substantial
threat to the public.191 The duty which the court imposed was,
therefore, unconstitutional. The Nally III court, however, effec-
tively avoided the paramount issue of constitutionality by focus-
ing on a tort analysis. 92
185. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 64-68 and 78-88 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 64-68; see also Comment, Whole Cloth, supra note 6, at 525-34
(the author argues that imposing a duty to refer would be unconstitutional under the
first amendment). But see Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling?, supra note 6, at 47 (the
author contends that imposing such a duty does not violate the Constitution).
188. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 245
(1987), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763 P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 1644 (1989).
189. Id. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
190. Nally, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
191. See infra notes 200-17 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text.
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B. Referral and Suicide Prevention
If the Nally III majority had overruled the lower court on
constitutional grounds, the California legislature would have
been foreclosed from imposing a statutory duty to refer. 93 Be-
cause the court did not rule on constitutional grounds, the legis-
lature is free to take steps to make clergy malpractice a more
viable cause of action. 94 Any such legislation would have to
withstand a constitutional challenge. Given the varying convic-
tions, opinions, and conclusions of courts and commentators, it
would be difficult to predict the outcome of such a challenge. 95
The questions of referral and who is best able to assist a
troubled individual are perhaps most critical when they involve
a potential suicide. Justice Johnson, speaking for the majority in
Nally H, stated that pastoral counselors should refer suicidal
counselees to those authorized to administer medication and ini-
tiate involuntary hospitalization.19 6 In Nally III, Justice Kauf-
man, in his concurrence, advocated that pastoral counselors re-
fer suicidal counselees to competent professional medical care. 9
Within a duty to refer to "others" is an underlying assumption
that those others are more able than the religious counselor to
prevent suicide.'98 This assumption is inconsistent not only with
religious beliefs, but also with contemporary professional
beliefs.9 9
The world of psychiatry does not profess that all potential
suicides should simply be referred for professional treatment.
The trend among professionals today is toward training the non-
professional to recognize and to deter, not just refer, the suicidal
193. See supra notes 151-59 and accompanying text. In Nally II, the majority em-
phasized that it did not foreclose the legislature from future action on clergy malprac-
tice. 240 Cal. Rptr. 215, 242.
194. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
196. Nally, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
197. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 310, 763 P.2d
948, 967, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97, 116 (1988) (Kaufman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1644 (1989).
198. In Nally II, the court stated: "The only way the public can guarantee the for-
mer [clergy's counselees] will have as good a chance of surviving as the latter [mental
health professional's counselee] is if pastoral counselors have the same legal duty to take
care that their counselees not kill themselves." 240 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
199. See supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
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individual.2 00 The role of psychiatrists and professional practi-
tioners increasingly has become that of a consultant to the com-
munity based programs of interrelated services geared toward
* suicide prevention.2 °0 Mental health professionals recognize that
nonprofessional volunteers are an integral part of any suicide
prevention program. 0 2
Supervised peer counseling has likewise been encouraged as
a possible treatment method for suicidal adolescents. 203 While
mental health professionals have been shown to hold negative
attitudes toward those who attempt suicide, 0 4 research suggests
that adolescents who have attempted suicide have a positive at-
titude toward suicidal peers.205 Author, D. Curran stated that
"[pleer counseling, in the form of professionally led groups of
teenage suicide attempters may be a modality offering a high
likelihood of providing the attempter with the support, help and
attention they often seek, while at the same time dealing with
some of the issues underlying the behavior. 2 06
The very suggestion of referral may actually worsen a crisis
by implying rejection and disapproval on the part of the one
person in whom the suicidal individual may have confided.2 7
Research indicates that thirty-seven percent of adolescents re-
ferred for counseling fail to comply. 208 Professional help may not
be the best answer for suicidal adolescents. 209 Rather, they may
200. "[Plrimary prevention refers to community wide programs which would seek to
address the root causes of adolescent suicide and depression by involving the family and
all other community based sources of potential support for adolescents." D. CURRAN,
supra note 90, at 178.
201. See J. ZUSMAN & D. DAVIDSON, supra note 92, at 59-73. The authors give an
overview of the development of "We Care," a community-based suicide prevention pro-
gram, which incorporates the services of nonprofessional volunteers and professional con-
sultants. Id.
202. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
203. See D. CURRAN, supra note 90, at 159.
204. Id. at 84-85.
205. Id. at 159, 189 (Colorado students who had been involved in a suicide preven-
tion program indicated that they would be more comfortable and more willing to inter-
vene to prevent suicide); see also Morrison, Youth Suicide: An Intervention Strategy, 32
Soc. WORK 537 (1987).
206. D. CURRAN, supra note 90, at 159.
207. Id. at 143-44.
208. Id. at 83-84.
209. Id. at 85.
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just need someone to be there and to understand.21 0
C. Communication Between the Secular and Nonsecular
Counselor
During the eight years that Nally was decided, an estimated
40,000 young people in the United States killed themselves.2 1"'
The California courts heard arguments regarding a method of
prevention which, even if constitutional, would probably be inef-
fective in preventing suicide in California or anywhere else in
America.2 2
Recent legislation, much of which focuses on schools, more
adequately reflects the current mode of suicide prevention meth-
ods.213 Schools are not required to refer suicidal students to
mental health professionals. Instead, they are directed to estab-
lish prevention programs within the schools and to train teach-
ers and students in suicide prevention. 214 The goal of the legisla-
tion mirrors the goal of prevention programs - to combine the
efforts and abilities of the professional and nonprofessional com-
munity in an attempt to save lives.215
The clergy are a part of this effort. Many of the volunteers
who work on the suicide hotlines are members of the clergy. 21 e A
number of prevention centers, nonreligious and religious, were
started by clergy members.21 7
210. See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text. "Many self-inflicted deaths
might be prevented if people were trained to recognize the warning signals. Mental-
health specialists estimate that all potential suicides give at least one warning, and that
80% of them give repeated warnings." D. FRANCIS, supra note 101, at 52.
211. G. EVANS & N. FARBEROW, supra note 89, at 5; see also supra notes 90-91 and
accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 193-210 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 93-109 and accompanying text.
216. Rescue Incorporated, a nondenominational agency based in Boston, Massachu-
setts, uses the volunteer services of over seventy clergypersons.
For the person who is threatening or trying to kill himself or herself, the various
suicide prevention and crisis center organizations extend life-saving assistance,
loving care, compassion and support. Every degree of teamwork must be employed
by such organizations, the professional staff, the significant volunteers, the clergy,
the police, the firemen and women ....
G. EVANS & N. FARBEROW, supra note 89, at 58.
217. Centers started by clergy people include Save-a-Life League, Samaritans, Res-
cue Inc., and Contact Teleministries USA. Id. at 56-58.
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The paramount concern of both secular and nonsecular
counselors involved in suicide prevention programs is the pre-
vention of suicide. These two groups should combine their ef-
forts to better understand both the practical and the theological
aspects of a suicidal individual's struggle. 1 8 The premise that
the secular and nonsecular worlds could learn from one another
is not new. Noted secular psychologist, 0. Howbard Mowrer,
suggests that the answer to the unrest in many persons' lives can
be found in religion.219 Mowrer also believes, however, that the
church has lost its ability to minister to psychological and social
needs because of its reliance on purely secular theory.2 0 Others
have suggested that psychiatry has failed to treat psychological
and social needs because of psychiatry's spiritual ignorance.221
The spiritual, psychological, and social aspects of suicide
will be better understood, and the counselee will be better
served, when there is greater communication among those in-
volved in suicide prevention.222 Secular and nonsecular counsel-
ors may find that their underlying theories of treatment some-
218. See infra notes 222-27 and accompanying text; see also FRANCIS, supra note
101, at 103-05. After one successful and a number of attempted suicides in Glastonbury,
Connecticut, local churches and community groups prepared a suicide prevention pres-
entation. To understand their own feelings on suicide, they studied reference materials
and pertinent Bible passages. "The goal was not to reach a consensus of opinion on sui-
cide but simply to address a difficult theological issue that many people avoid until they
are faced with a crisis." Id at 104. The subject of suicide was then addressed in schools
and in churches. Informational brochures were distributed, and people were invited to
attend a performance of a play on suicide, followed by group discussions. Id. at 103-05;
see also G. EVANS & N. FARBEROW, supra note 89, at 56 ("The potential suicide will often
confide in a clergyman or woman before they will anyone else - because they view
them as people who understand their futility and anguish, yet won't betray their
confidences.").
219. See 0. MOWEER, THE NEW GROUP THERAPY 13 (1964); see also 0. MOWRER. THE
CRISIS OF PSYCHIATRY AND RELIGION 60-80 (1961).
220. Mowrer contends that the church relies on Freudian theory, a theory which he
deems a farce. 0. MOWRER, THE NEW GROUP THERAPY, supra note 219, at 14-15. Adams
lends credibility to Mowrer's contention by stating that many counseling books for the
clergy are based on a Freudian ethic of nonresponsibility. J. ADAMS, COMPETENT, supra
note 79, at 18. Today, many others question the validity of Freudian theory on suicide.
See, e.g., D. EVERSTINE & L. EVERSTINE, supra note 92, at 203-05.
221. See 0. MOWRER, THE CRISIS OF PSYCHIATRY AND RELIGION, supra note 219, at
202-03; FRANKL, THE DOCTOR AND THE SOUL ix-xxi (1968). Frankl suggests a theory of
logo-therapy which would supplement psychotherapy by enabling the therapist to objec-
tively assess a person's spiritual distress. Id. at 17.
222. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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times coincide with one another. With respect to confession, the
Christian may call it biblical,22 ' and the psychologist may call it
therapeutic, but both encourage it as a method of treatment.22'
Even when they differ in theory, the secular and nonsecular
counselors can complement one another. Knowledge of the im-
portance of direct questions about a counselee's suicidal inten-
tions would not burden the pastoral counselor in the practice of
his religion even if the counselor believed it was unbiblical to
refer to secular professionals.225 Similarly, an understanding of
an individual's spiritual struggle would not burden the mental
health professional in the implementation of his treatment.226
Such knowledge and such understanding would only enhance
the ability of those counselors to prevent suicide.2 7
D. An Alternative to a Legal Duty to Refer
The integrated, community approach to suicide prevention
provides a forum where counselors can communicate and learn
from one another.228 The state cannot simply mandate that the
223. "Therefore confess your sins to each other and pray for each other so that you
may be healed." James 5:16 (New International). "If we confess our sins, he [God] is
faithful and just and will forgive us our sins and purify us from all unrighteousness." 1
John 1:9 (New International).-
224. When counseling a suicidal counselee, Adams stated that "[clounselors should
acknowledge that he [the counselee] is probably right about the present worthlessness of
his life, and should attempt to discover how bad he has been. However, they should take
issue with his proposed solution, and instead point him to God's solution through repen-
tance and holy living." J. ADAMS, COMPETENT, supra note 79, at 140-41 n.1. Mowrer de-
scribes a Protestant minister who overcame extreme anxiety by being openly honest
about himself. 0. MOWRER, THE NEW GROUP THERAPY, supra note 219, at 72-90. Mowrer
also relates the story of a woman who overcame her suicidal behavior through an open
and honest confession of her past. Id. at 110-16.
225. See supra notes 105-09, 174-92 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 200-15 and accompanying text. The content of the counseling
provided by the defendant pastors is unknown. Likewise, it is not known if the mental
health professionals who saw Nally were aware of his spiritual struggle. The pastors
should have directly questioned Nally about his suicidal intentions. Furthermore, the
mental health professionals should have had an understanding of the struggle Nally may
have had with the eternal consequences of suicide, for example, whether one who com-
mitted suicide would go to hell. See Nally v, Grace Community Church of the Valley, 240
Cal. Rptr. 215, 238 (1987) (review granted for California Supreme Court opinion, not
printed in official reporter, see 194 Cal. App. 3d 1147 (1987)), rev'd, 47 Cal. 3d 278, 763
P.2d 948, 253 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1644 (1989).
228. See supra notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
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clergy get involved in suicide prevention because that would
raise the same constitutional questions raised by imposing a
duty to refer.22 e The state may, however, mandate that the
clergy be invited to participate in various research and preven-
tion programs.
Legislation which incorporates the joint efforts of schools,
teachers, parents, law enforcement officers, social service agen-
cies and others interested in suicide prevention, already exists. 3 0
The clergy should be incorporated into such legislation, as in
New York, where the law expressly includes the clergy among
those to be educated about suicide prevention.23
The church has demonstrated a willingness and a desire to
learn about suicide prevention and, when given the opportunity,
participates in prevention programs.2 2 The more knowledgeable
the church becomes, the more apt the church will be to create its
own standards for pastoral counseling of suicidal individuals.
One Christian writer recommended that the church establish an
ordination exam for ministers comparable to a bar exam for law-
yers.23 8 The church could conceivably examine candidates on
their knowledge of suicide prevention, and could mandate that
suicide prevention courses be a prerequisite to ordination.
Ultimately, the decision for such modifications must rest
with the church, just as the decision to incorporate a community
approach would rest with an individual mental health profes-
sional. What must be protected is the church's discretion, and
its absolute right pursuant to the first amendment, to counsel
independently according to sincerely held religious beliefs.2
V. Conclusion
The tort of clergy malpractice in pastoral counseling was ar-
guably established through an effort to hold pastoral counselors
legally accountable for one young man's suicide, and to prevent
229. See supra notes 53-88, 174-92 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text. The 1989 Christian Teachers
Convention in Albany, New York included a forum on suicide: "Suicide?? It Can't Hap-
pen Here - Can It??".
233. Mitchell, supra note 28, at 14.
234. See supra notes 174-92 and accompanying text.
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further suicides. Suicide is a tragedy which profoundly effects all
those left behind. The overwhelming interest in the prevention
of suicide and the preservation of life is shared by all. This is
one area in which the church and the state are not at odds with
each other.
However, clergy malpractice actions will not bring about the
intended result of suicide prevention. Not only are such actions
an unconstitutional infringement of the free exercise and estab-
lishment clauses, but they are also ineffective in preventing the
occurrence of suicide. Rather than get embroiled in a controver-
sial first amendment battle over an action which holds no prom-
ise as a preventive measure, the church and the state should en-
deavor to maintain an approach which preserves liberty and
protects life.
"[A]ny man's death diminishes me, because I am involved
in Mankinde; And therefore never send to know for whom the
bell tolls; It tolls for thee. '2 3 5
C. Grace McCaffrey
235. THE COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE OF JOHN DONNE & THE COMPLETE
POETRY OF WILLIAM BLAKE 332 (1941) (emphasis omitted).
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